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APPELLATE REVIEW OF ERRORS CON-
FESSED BY ATTORNEY GENERAL.-
[Federal] Defendants were con-
victed of arson for setting fire to a
fraternity house of which both were
members. Reliable evidence as to
defendants' innocence was not ad-
mitted by the trial court. After
judgment, the attorney general con-
ducted an independent investigation
which convinced him that the de-
fendants were innocent. There-
upon, he filed a confession of error
in respect to the appellants' assign-
ments. Held, on appeal, reversed.
But, notwithstanding the attorney
general's confession of error, the
court was bound to review the er-
rors assigned: Parlton v. United
States (1935) 75 F. (2d) 772.
There seems to be no doubt that
it is entirely proper for the attorney
general to confess error when he
deems it apparent: State v. Bailey
(1891) 85 Iowa 713, 50 N. W. 561;
State v. Goddard (1898) 146 Mo.
177, 48 S. W. 62. Nevertheless, no
uniformity of decisions can be
found as to whether or not the court
will reverse without looking into the
record. The early common law view
appears to have been that a confes-
sion of error on the part of the at-
torney general would not divest the
appellate court from its duty of
looking into the record to determine
for itself whether or not there is
error: Rex v. Wilkcs (1770) 4 Bur-
rows 2527, 2551. At the present day
many courts express the opinion
that the record should be examined,
thus throwing the discretion on the
court which will not approve unless
it is of the opinion that due admin-
istration of justice requires that the
prosecution be ended: State v.
Mortensen (1922) 224 Ill. App. 221;
Henderson v. State (1921) 18 Okl.
Cr. 611, 197 Pac. 7-20; Green v.
State (1921) 18 Okla. Cr. 715,
197 Pac. 1077; Bindrun v. State
(1924) 27 Okla. Cr. 372, 228 Pac.
168; State v. Stevens (1910)
153 N. C. 604, 69 S. E. 11. Further,
the California court has recognized
that the power to set aside or mod-
ify a judgment in a criminal case,
except for legal grounds appearing
on a record duly presented is not
judicial. It states that it is a branch
of the governor's pardoning power
and cannot be exercised by the at-
torney general either directly or
through the medium of the court:
People v. Mooney (1917) 175 Cal.
666, 166 Pac. 999; People v.
Mooney (1917) 176 Cal. 105,
167 Pac. 696. Other courts will
reverse without perusing the record
upon mere filing a confession. No
grounds for so doing are stated:
Purgon v. State (1876) 52 Ind. 390;
People v. Lewis (1899) 127 Cal.
207, 59 Pac. 830; Zancannetti v.
[614]
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People (1917) 63 Colo. 252, 165
Pac. 612; Richardson v. People
(1918) 69 Colo. 155, 170 Pac. 189.
The view taken in the instant
case would seem to be the better
one. It is claimed that the attorney
general is open to danger of cor-
ruption, intimidation and coercion.
Further, a filing of confession is, in
effect, a pardoning power which
may be misused, particularly if the
reviewing court does not examine
the record: Swancara, "Confessions
of Error in Criminal Cases" (1923)
96 Central L. J. 204. See Baker
and DeLong, "The Prosecuting At-
torney" (1923) 24 J. Crim. L. 1065,
where the advisability of limiting
the wide discretion now possessed
by prosecuting attorneys is dis-
cussed. Certainly a reversal of
conviction for a crime without an
examination of the record gives to
the prosecuting attorney a wide
range of discretion, leaving room
for fraud, collusion and "fixing."
In DeLong, "The State Attorney
General" (1934) 25 J. Crim. L. 374
the almost unlimited discretion of
the attorney general before and dur-
ing a criminal trial is explained.
Even if wide discretion before trial
is necessary, it would seem best,
once the defendant is convicted by
judicial pronouncement, to take the
case out- of the prosecuting at-
torney's hands and to allow only the
governor's pardon based upon equit-
able considerations or the legal
mechanism of the court of appeal to
operate in reversal of judgment.
EUGENE BuscH.
EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY OF
OTHER CRIMES TO PROVE IDENTITY.
[Canada] The defendant was con-
victed upon a charge of receiving
stolen goods. At the trial a police
constable was permitted to testify
that he recognized the accused from
a police photograph. The grounds
for the appeal were that the admis-
sion of the testimony of the con-
stable was prejudicial in that the
jury might infer a police record.
Held, on appeal, reversed: although
the evidence was not affirmatively
shown to be prejudicial the defend-
ant is entitled to a new trial: Rex
v. McLaren (Alberta 1935) 63 Can.
Cr. Cas. 257.
Generally, the state cannot prove
any crime not alleged in the indict-
ment merely for the purpose of rais-
ing a presumption that the defend-
ant would be more apt to commit
the crime in question' 1 Wigmore,
"Evidence" (2d ed. 1923) §§193,
194; People v. Shea (1895) 147 N.
Y. 78, 41 N. E. 505. The exceptions
to this general rule are when evi-
dence of other crimes tends directly
to establish (1) the motive (People
v. Scheck (1934) 356 Ill. 56, 190
N. E. 108), (2) the intent (People
v. Cione (1920) 293 Ii). 321, 127 N.
E. 646), (3) absence of mistake or
accident (State v. Jones (1903) 171
Mo. 401, 71 S. W.'680), (4) a com-
mon scheme or plan embracing the
commission of two or more ,crimes
so related to each other that proof
of one tends to establis4 the others
(State v. Thuna (1910) 50-Wash.
689, 109 Pac. 331), (5) sex crimes
(State v. S'vieeney (930) 180
Minn. 450, 231 N. W. 225), (6)
identity of the personi c harge d with
the commission of the crime. 1
Wigmore, op. cit. supra §§,00-306.
See generally the excellent discus-
sion in People v. Mojineux '(90i)
168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286.
It is with exception (6) that this
case is involved. Few cases apply
the rule in this situation because
there cannot be nany"instances
where separate crimes, with no
unity or connection of motive, in-
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tent or plan will serve to legally
identify the defendant. In Cross v.
People (1868) 47 Ill. 152, 95 Am.
Dec. 474, the witness, who had
talked with the accused after the
forgery, was permitted to relate
what was said as to how other
forgeries were committed, thus help-
ing to identify the defendant. To
prove identity of one as a member
of a gang it was necessary to show
that defendant was present with the
gang on other occasions of similar
character: Jenkins v. Common-
wealth (1915) 167 Ky. 544, 180 S.
W. 961. In a trial for robbery where
the identity of the accused was in
question, evidence of witnesses who
had recognized defendant in other
robberies was admissible, when lim-
ited ,to that very point: State v.
Caton (1931) 134 Kan. 136, 4 P.
(2d) 677; Whiteman v. State
(1928) 119 Ohio 285, 164 N. E. 5.
Again, if properly limited, evidence
that defendant had sold liquor at
times other than charged is admis-
sible to show identity: Thomas v.
State (1926) 130 Tex. Cr. 671, 282
S. W. 237. In a prosecution for
rape, aticles stolen by defendant and
lost at the scene of the crime were
admissible to prove identity even
though they proved a prior robbery:
State v. Hicks (1934) 180 La. 281,
156 So. 353. See annotations in
(1919) 3 A. L. R. 1540; (1923) 22
A. L. R. 1016; (1923) 27 A. L. R.
357; (1929) 63 A. L. R. 602.
The question narrows itself to the
point directly presented in the in-
stant case. It is well settled that
photographs are proper evidence
when they accurately portray that
which they represent: 2 Wigmore,
op. cit. supra §792; see Note (1923)
23 J. Crim. L. 853. The trouble
arises when a photograph is sought
to be introduced that on its face
shows or implies a previous criminal
record. The question was presented
in People v. Goltra (1931) 115 Cal.
App. 539, 2 P. (2d) 35, but was not
directly passed upon for the photo-
graph was held inadmissible because
no witness testified it was a likeness
of the accused. The fact that it
came from a: rogue's gallery was
known. The court in Common-
wealth v. Luccitti (1928) 295 Pa.
190, 145 Atl. 85, admitted a photo-
graph from a rogue's gallery where
no markings showed whence it
came. It was stated that ordinarily
such evidence should be kept from
the jury, although it would not
necessarily mean that defendant
was wanted! for a crime. The
proposition was directly passed upon
in two cases and in both it was held
that photographs known to be from
a rogue's gallery were admissible to
prove identity: State v. Leopold
(1929) 110 Conn. 55, 147 Atl. 118;
State v. King (1918) 102 Kan. 155,
169 Pac. 557. One court has even
gone so far as to allow a warden
of another state prison to identify
the accused from a photograph
taken while he was in prison: State
v. Jones (1914) 48 Mont. 505, 139
Pac. 441. Cf. Rocchia v. U. S. (C.
C. A. 9th, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 966
where a fingerprint card which was
presented to jury for inspection bore
a reference to previous misconduct
of defendant. Defendant was there
held to have waived any objection
he might have had.
The above cases show that the
courts have admitted evidence of
other crimes when it was reasonably
necessary to establish one or more
of thq exceptions described. In the
instant case, if the testimony of the
constable was probative and neces-
sary to prove the identity of the ac-
cused, the fact alone that it was
possibly prejudicial should not have
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justified a reversal of the convic-
tion.
CHARLEs B. RonisoN.
EVIDENCE IN MITIGATION OR Ex-
"CUSE A=R PROOF OF HOMICIDE.--
[California] Defendant was con-
victed on a charge of first-degree
murder. The court instructed the
jury in the words of Cal. Pen. Code
(1935) §1105 that, if they believed
that the killing had been proved,
the defendant must make out his
case in mitigation, justification, or
excuse by some proof strong enough
to create in the minds of the jurors
a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
Objection was made that the in-
struction was erroneous, in that it
shifted the burden of proof to de-
fendant. Held, on appeal, affirmed.
The statute did not impose the ulti-
mate burden of proof on defendant,
but merely the burden of going for-
ward with the evidence: People v.
Madison (Cal. 1935) 46 P. (2d)
159.
Apparent contradictions in both
civil and criminal cases have arisen
from a loose use of the phrase,
"burden of proof." The ultimate
burden in criminal cases is on the
prosecution at all times to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt. But
in a secondary sense the burden
does shift to the accused to produce
some evidence in excuse or mitiga-
tion, once the killing has been
proved by the prosecution: 4 Wig-
more, "Evidence" (2 ed. 1923)
§2485.
California Penal Code (1935)
§1105 declares: "The homicide -by
the defendant being proved, the
burden of proving circumstances of
mitigation, or that justify or ex-
cuse it, devolves upon the accused."
This is a correct statement of the
law as found in decisions of other
states: Wheeler v. State (1934) 179
Ga. 287, 175 S. E. 540; State v.
Ward (1931) 51 Idaho 68, 11 P.
(2d) 620; State v. Mangino (1931)
108 N. J. L. 475, 156 AtI. 430, Note
(1932) 22 J. Crim. L. 907; Com-
monwealth v. Marshall (1927) 287
Pa. 512, 135 Atl. 301; Olive, v.
Commonwealth (1928) 151 Va. 533,
145 S. E. 307. See Note (1931) 21
J. Crim. L. 609. It is also in ac-
cord with similar statutes in other
jurisdictions: Rosser v. State (Ariz.
1935) 42 P. (2d) 613; Wilson v.
State (1916) 126 Ark. 354, 190 S.
W. 441; Lumpkin v. State (1911)
5 Okla. Cr. 485, 115 Pac. 478.
The California court has uni-
formly held it is not error to give
an instruction in the words of
§1105: People v. McClure (1906)
148 Cal. 418, 83 Pac. 437; People v.
Bannon (1922) 59 Cal. App. 50, 209
Pac. 1029; People v. McCurdy
(1934) 140 Cal. App. 499, 35 P.
(2d) 569. In the instant case, the
instruction is even more favorable
to defendant than is §1105 given
alone. For the trial judge ex-
plained to the jury the legal mean-
)ingf of the statute, viz,, that the
only burden on accused is to raise
a reasonable doubt in the minds of
the jurors as to his guilt. Clearly
the court could not call qtfch a fa-
vorable and unambiguous instedc-
tion reversible error: People v.
Casey (1907) 231 111, 261, 83 N. E.
278.
The Illinois statute, Ill, Rev. Stat.
(Smith-Hurd 1935) e, 38, §373, is
almost identical to California Penal
Code §1105, and over a long period
of years the Illinois court has fol-
lowed the general rule ar shown
above. There are numerous deci-
sions to the effect that, once the
killing by the defendant is proved,
the burden of proof shifts to him
to produce evidence in justification
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or excuse: Murphy v. People
(1865) 37 Ill. 447; Kota v. People
(1891) 136 Ill. 655, 27 N. E. 53;
Wacaser v. People (1890) 134 Ill.
438, 25 N. E. 564 (instruction er-
roneous in requiring proof by de-
fendant to satisfaction of jury);
People v. Duncan (1890) 134 Ill.
110, 24 N. E. 765 (instruction in
exact language of §373); Wallace
v. People (1896) 159 Ill. 446, 42
N. E. 771; Henry v. People (1902)
198 Ill. 162, 65 N. E. 120 (accused
must merely raise reasonable doubt
when all evidence considered). But
in People v. Durand (1923) 307 Ill.
611, 139 N. E. 78, the court said
an instruction in the language of
§373 should not be given. Then
came a similar holding in People v.
Sterankovich (1924) 313 Ill. 556,
145 N. E. 172. As a result, al-
though §373 is still included in the
Illinois Revised Statutes (Smith-
Hurd 1929, 1935), the annotations
infer it should never be given in a
charge to the jury, and this seems
to be the generally accepted view.
It is true that in the Durand case,
supra, court said §373 should not
be given to the jury, but it quali-
fied its statement ; as follows:
"Some instructions given for the
people on self-defense are errone-
ous. Had all the other instructions
bearing on self-defense been ac-
curate, then the giving of this in-
struction (§373) would not neces-
sarily be reversible error."
Therefore it is believed that the
giving of §373 verbatim to the jury
is not per se erroneous, in spite of
the fact that such is the prevalent
opinion, based on the annotations.
It is conceivable that §373 might be
prejudicial if given by itself, but
not if it is properly supplemented
by other correct instructions. This
is indicated by the language of the
court in two later cases: People v.
Meyer (1928) 331 Ill. 608, 163 N.
E. 453; People v. Russell (1926)
322 II1. 295, 153 N. E. 389. These
cases clearly show that the Illinois
court recognizes the principle that
the burden of proof in its secondary
meaning does shift to the accused
to produce evidence in mitigation
or justification, once the killing by
the defendant has been proved.
The decision in the instant case
seems to be in accord' with the
weight of authority. Since the
statute contains a correct statement
of the law, an instruction in the
words thereof should not be con-
sidered prejudicial. However, it
would seem abvisable for the trial
judge to explain the technical lan-
guage of the legislature to the jury
by additional instructions making it
clear that, as to mitigation, the ac-
cused merely has the burden of go-
ing forward with the evidence and
that there, as elsewhere, the state




ENCE OF GuILTY KNOWLEDGE FROM
RECENT PossEssioN.-[Federal] De-
fendant was convicted of knowingly
receiving, concealing and retaining
in his possession with intent to con-
vert to his own use, two army pis-
tols, stamped with the words
"United States Property." They had
been stolen from a National Guard
Armory 293 days before being
found on defendant's person when
he was arrested for participating in
a shooting affray in company with
gangsters. Defendant denied hav-
ing possession. Held: on appeal,
reversed. Defendant's possession,
in absence of supporting evidence,
was not sufficiently recent to sustain
a finding of guilty knowledge:
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Gargotta v. United States (C. C.
A. 8th, 1935) 77 F. (2d) 977.
It has often been stated as a gen-
eral rule that possession, to justify
an inference of guilty knowledge,
must be "recent possession:" See
generally, Wertheimer v. State
(1929) 201 Ind. 572, 169 N. E. 40,
68 A. L. R. 178, Annotation at 187.
The cases persistently use the term,
often quite casually; but what con-
stitutes "recent" possession depends
largely upon the circumstances in
any particular case, and no attempt
is made to define it: See annotation
to the case of State v. Drew (1904)
179 Mo. 315, 78 S. W. 594, 101 A.
S. R. 474, at 510.
Mr. Wharton says that the sig-
nificance of "recent possession" is
affected by the identifying ear-
marks on the stolen article in ques-
tion: 2 Wharton, "Crim. Ev."
(10th ed. 1912), §760. Early Eng-
lish cases placed importance on the
"readiness with which goods might
pass from hand to hand." In Rex
v. Adams (1829) 172 Eng. Rep.
563, a man was found in possession
of some tools three months after
the theft; it was observed by the
court that these might pass readily
from hand to hand, and the defend-
ant was acquitted without being
called upon for explanation. But
in Rex v. Partridge (1836) 173 Eng.
Rep. 243, a man was found in pos-
session of two ends of woolen cloth
in an unfinished state, two months
after they had been stolen; the court
thought that these particular goods
were not such as might pass readily
from hand to hand, and it was held
a question to go to the jury, which
subsequently found him guilty. The
same idea is incorporated in Roscoe,
"Crim. Ev." (14th ed; 1921), page
22. The author agrees with the de-
cisions that the possession must be
recent, "but what shall be deemed
recent possession," he elaborates,
"must be detemined by the nature of
the articles stolen, i. e., whether
they are of a nature likely to pass
rapidly from hand to hand; or of
which the accused would be likely
from his situation in life, or voca-
tion, to become possessed inno-
cently."
If we accept Roscoe's viewpoint,
the determination of what consti-
tutes "recent" in any particular case
is not a question of law to be de-
cided by the court having in mind
only the time element. "Recent-
ness" of possession will be affected
by the nature of the article, its
readiness in passing from hand to
hand, defendant's situation in life,
and the circumstances of the pos-
session; and whether a question of
fact is presented for the jury will
depend upon the violence of the in-
ference to be drawn from a com-
bination of these evidentiary ele-
ments: State v. fennett (1883) 88
N. C. 665. These elements are
weighed by the courts today in rais-
ing an inference of guilt, but col-
laterally with the time element. Few
cases consider them as part of the
"recentness" problem itself. See
State v. Jenkins (Mo. 1919) 213 S.
W. 796, at 799.
The Circuit Court of Appeals in
the principal case excuses defend-
ant's failure to explain possession
by the fact that he consistently de-
nied possession, holding that there-
fore no explanation was necessary:
Opinion, page 983. Nevertheless, the
court recognizes as one of the
proven facts that the pistols were
actually found in defendant's pos-
session: Opinion, page 981. If we
are to believe the testimony of the
two police officers who took the
pistols from defendant, then de-
fendant's testimony is pirjured.
But the effect of the court's ruling
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that the evidence was insufficient
to go to the jury, is to condone the
perjury and hold that it is not a
guilty circumstance which expands
the inference rising out of the pos-
session. It has been held that de-
nial of possession of stolen goods,
if shown to be false, is a circum-
stance of guilt against the defend-
ant as a matter of substantive proof
and not merely as affecting credi-
bility: People v. Levison (1860)
16 Cal. 99; Huggins v. People
(1890) 135 Ill. 243, 25 N. E. 1002.
The opinion in the principal case,
however, not only fails to appraise
defendant's denial, in the light of
the police officers' testimony, but
allows the perjury to operate as a
device to relieve defendant of ex-
plaining some very untoward cir-
cumstances.
Regardless of surrounding cir-
cumstances it is hard to call pos-
session 293 days after the theft
"recent" possession. But defend-
ant's possession of pistols plainly
marked "United States Property,"
discovered when he was using the
pistols for an unlawful purpose and
in company with gangsters, which
possession is further characterized
by the fact that defendant not only
refused to offer any explanation but
perjured himself by falsely disclaim-
ing that he had possession, would
seem to be sufficient to take the case
to the jury.
LAWRENCE B. MuiD0cic.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - D,-
MURRER TO INFORMATION.[Minn.]
The defendant was arraigned on
November 26, 1934, on an informa-
tion, filed the same day, charging
that he had, on October 13, 1925,
been guilty of acts constituting him
an accessory after the fact to a
felony. The defendant demurred to
the information on the ground that
it showed on its face that the crime
was committed more than three
years before the date of filing. The
demurrer was overruled and the de-
fendant entered a plea of guilty.
Defendant then moved the court to
reconsider its ruling on the de-
murrer, and, if still of the opinion
that it should be overruled, to grant
a new trial. From an order deny-
ing the motion the defendant ap-
pealed. Held: on appeal, reversed,
with order to discharge the defend-
ant from custody. When the in-
formation shows that, since the of-
fense charged was committed, the
time within which prosecution may
be had has elapsed, and there is no
allegation of facts which would
avoid the operation of the statute,
that information is demurrable:
State v. Tupa (Minn. 1935) 260 N.
W. 875.
The rule in the majority of juris-
dictions is that the objection of the
statute of limitations is not ground
for demurrer. However, 2 Minn.
Stat. (Mason 1927) §10690 provides
that a defendant may demur to an
indictment when there appears on
its face any "legal bar to the prose-
cution." An identical statutory pro-
vision in anothe1 jurisdiction has
been interpreted to allow the statute
to be raised on- demurrer: People
v. Ayherns (1890) 85 Cal. 86, 24 P.
635.
While there is some authority to
the effect that it is not necessary
for an indictment to anticipate a
defense of the statute of limitations
by allegation of matter avoiding it:
People v. Bailey (1918) 103 Misc.
366, 171 N. Y. S. 394; State v. Uns-
worth (1913) 85 N. J. Law 237, 88
Atl. 1097; U. S. v. Cook (1872) 84
U. S. 168, the more general rule is
that the statute must be avoided by
appropriate allegation: "Lamkin v.
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People (1880) 94 Ill. 501; Garrison
v. People (1877), 87 Ill. 96; Rouse
v. State (1902) 44 Fla. 148, 37 S.
784; Heckrnar v. State (1903) 44
Tex. Cr. 533, 72 S. W. 587. Rea-
sons for this divergence from the
rule in civil cases that the statute
is matter of defense and need not be
anticipated by appropriate allega-
tion, which rule is carried over into
the criminal law by those courts
adhering to the minority rule, are
seldom advanced. Perhaps it is an
attribute of the policy which dic-
tates that all intendments be in
favor of the accused. Regardless
of which rule is followed, the mat-
ter avoiding the statute would seem
to become part of the state's case,
to be proved "beyond a reasonable
doubt and to a moral certainty."
However, the modern trend is to-
ward the relaxation of the formal
requirements of indictments; in-
deed, indictments going little further
than to specify the section of the
criminal code claimed to have been
violated have been sustained: Peo-
ple v. Bogdanoff (1930) 254 N. Y.
16, 171 N. E. 890. The accused cer-
tainly would know whether the
statute would offer him a valid de-
fense, so it is difficult to see how he
would be materially prejudiced by
requiring the statute to be raised
first at the trial. The requisites of
a fair trial do not demand that he
be informed in advance that the
state is prepared to meet his objec-
tion based on the statute when he
raises it.
Ordinarily, if the facts were such
as would avoid the statute, the
prosecution could, by virtue of the
liberal amendment statute, 2 Minn.
Stat. (Mason 1927) §10648, have
amended the information by iisert-
ing appropriate allegations after the
sustaining of the demurrer and be-
fore the trial had commenced. In
the instant case, since the demurrer
was overruled by the lower court,
there was no occasion for the prose-
cution to amend at that time; the
action of the appellate court in dis-
missing precluded any opportunity
of doing so. It is submitted that in
requiring the anticipatory allega-
tion the court demonstrated an un-
necessary adherence to the technical
requirements of criminal pleading,
and reached an undesirable result in
this case.
FA NCIs D. RoTH.
